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Abstract
Private information retrieval (PIR) allows a user to retrieve a desired message out of K
possible messages from N databases without revealing the identity of the desired message.
There has been significant recent progress on understanding fundamental information theoretic
limits of PIR, and in particular the download cost of PIR for several variations. Majority of
existing works however, assume the presence of replicated databases, each storing all the K
messages. In this work, we consider the problem of PIR from storage constrained databases.
Each database has a storage capacity of µKL bits, where K is the number of messages, L is the
size of each message in bits, and µ ∈ [1/N, 1] is the normalized storage.
In the storage constrained PIR problem, there are two key design questions: a) how to
store content across each database under storage constraints; and b) construction of schemes
that allow efficient PIR through storage constrained databases. The main contribution of this
work is a general achievable scheme for PIR from storage constrained databases for any value of
storage. In particular, for any (N,K), with normalized storage µ = t/N , where the parameter
t can take integer values t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, we show that our proposed PIR scheme achieves
a download cost of
(
1 + 1t +
1
t2 + · · ·+ 1tK−1
)
. The extreme case when µ = 1 (i.e., t = N)
corresponds to the setting of replicated databases with full storage. For this extremal setting,
our scheme recovers the information-theoretically optimal download cost characterized by Sun
and Jafar as
(
1 + 1N + · · ·+ 1NK−1
)
. For the other extreme, when µ = 1/N (i.e., t = 1), the
proposed scheme achieves a download cost of K. The most interesting aspect of the result is
that for intermediate values of storage, i.e., 1/N < µ < 1, the proposed scheme can strictly
outperform memory-sharing between extreme values of storage.
1 Introduction
Within the past few decades, there has been a surge in research towards solving various problems
related to private information retrieval. The goal behind the private information retrieval (PIR)
This work was supported by the NSF Grant CAREER-1651492.
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problem is to determine the most efficient solution that allows a user to retrieve a certain mes-
sage from a set of distributed databases - each contains multiple messages - without any of those
databases determining which message has been requested. Since the introduction of PIR in [1], this
problem has received significant attention in the computer science community [2–5] and PIR proto-
cols have found use in information-theoretic security, oblivious transfer protocols, locally decodable
codes and numerous other areas. The classical PIR problem involves N non-colluding databases,
where each stores K messages. A user requests a message by generating a query to each database.
The databases each respond to the user with an answer. Then the user must be able to correctly
obtain the desired message from all N answers. To ensure privacy, every query and every answer is
independent of the requested message. Based on the Shannon theoretic formulation, the rate of the
private information retrieval problem is set as the number of desired information bits per number
of downloaded bits. The information theory capacity, C, is then the maximum PIR rate possible.
Previous works observe the PIR rate with full storage among the databases, i.e. each database
stores every message. Under this assumption, one of the first achievable PIR rate was found by
Shah, Rashmi and Ramchandran [6] to equal 1− 1N .
In a very interesting recent work [7], Sun and Jafar characterized the exact information-theoretic
capacity (or the inverse of download cost) of the (N,K) PIR problem as (1+1/N + . . . 1/NK−1)−1,
improving upon the previous best known achievable rate for the PIR problem [6]. Since the appear-
ance of [7], significant progress has been made on a variety of variations of the basic PIR problem.
We briefly describe some of these advances next. The case of T -colluding PIR (or TPIR in short)
was investigated in [8], where any T databases out of N are able to collude, i.e., they can share
the queries. Robust PIR, in which any N out of M databases (with N ≤ M) fail to respond was
also investigated in [8], for which the capacity is found to be the same as that of TPIR. In a recent
work, [9] characterized the capacity of PIR with byzantine databases (or BPIR), i.e., a scenario in
which any L out of N databases are adversarial (i.e. they can respond with incorrect bits after
receiving the query). The above previous works assumed the presence of replicated databases,
i.e., each database stores all the K messages. The capacity of PIR with databases storing MDS
coded messages was considered in [10] and the capacity was subsequently characterized by Banawan
and Ulukus in [11]. This setting was further investigated for the scenario where any T out of N
databases can collude, an aspect termed MDS-TPIR [12, 13] although its capacity remains open
for general set of parameters. The problem of symmetric PIR (SPIR) was studied in [14]. In this
setting, privacy is enforced in both directions: i.e., user must be able to retrieve the message of
interest privately while at the same time the databases must avoid any information leakage to the
user about the remaining messages. The exact capacities for this symmetric PIR problem both
for non-coded (SPIR) and MDS-coded (MDS-SPIR) messages were characterized in [14, 15]. The
case of multi-message PIR (MPIR) was investigated in [16,17], in which the user wants to privately
retrieve P ≥ 1 out of K messages. The capacity of cache constrained PIR (in which the user has a
local cache of limited storage) was recent characterized in [18], and it was shown that memory shar-
ing based PIR scheme is information theoretically optimal (also see recent works [19–21] on other
variations of the cache aided PIR problem). Majority of above works however, assume the presence
of replicated databases, each storing all the K messages. Indeed, exceptions to this statement
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include the work on the case when database store MDS coded data, and the databases must also
satisfy the k-out-of-N recovarability constraint. Furthermore, [22] also investigated the problem of
limited storage PIR for the special case of K = 2 messages and N = 2 databases. They present
interesting lower and upper bounds on the capacity for this special case, and show the optimality
of the proposed scheme for the case of linear schemes. However, at this point, generalization of the
scheme for (N,K) = (2, 2) to arbitrary (N,K) remains elusive.
Summary of Contribution and Insights– In this work, we consider the problem of PIR
from storage constrained databases. Each database has a storage capacity of µKL bits, where K
is the number of messages, L is the size of each message in bits, and µ ∈ [1/N, 1] is the normalized
storage. In the storage constrained PIR problem, there are two key design questions: a) how to
place content across each database under storage constraints; and b) construction of schemes that
allow efficient PIR through storage constrained databases. The main contribution of this work is
an achievable scheme for PIR from storage constrained databases for any arbitrary (N,K), and
any value of storage. In particular, for any (N,K), with normalized storage µ = t/N , where the
parameter t can take integer values t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, we show that our proposed PIR scheme
achieves a download cost of (1 + 1t +
1
t2
+ · · ·+ 1
tK−1 ).
There are two main ingredients in our storage constrained PIR scheme which we briefly explain
next. The first ingredient is the storage strategy across databases, which is inspired by the work
of Maddah-Ali and Niesen [23] on the fundamental limits of caching. In particular, we split each
message into a number of sub-messages (also known as sub-packets in the caching literature), and
index each sub-message by a sub-set of the N databases, which end up storing the sub-message.
The amount of per-message sub-packetization is carefully chosen to satisfy the storage constraint at
each database. As it turns out, this storage strategy naturally helps in the design of the second main
ingredient, i.e., the design of efficient PIR by utilizing the limited storage. To this end, we tailor the
key components of (full storage) PIR scheme of Sun and Jafar to the case of limited storage setting,
by enforcing symmetry across messages, and exploiting side information from other databases. The
main differences from that of Sun and Jafar are two fold: a) from a privacy perspective, enforcement
of message symmetry is necessary only across sub-packets for each message that are stored at a
database; b) on the other hand, side information can only be partially exploited depending on the
contents shared across databases, which in turn depends on the amount of storage. The extreme
case when µ = 1 (i.e., t = N) corresponds to the setting of replicated databases with full storage.
For this extremal setting, our scheme recovers the information-theoretically optimal download cost
characterized by Sun and Jafar as (1 + 1N + · · · + 1NK−1 ). For the other extreme, when µ = 1/N
(i.e., t = 1), the proposed scheme achieves a download cost of K, which is information theoretically
optimal. The most interesting aspect of the result is that for intermediate values of storage, i.e.,
1/N < µ < 1, the proposed scheme strictly outperforms memory-sharing.
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Figure 1: Storage Constrained Private Information Retrieval.
2 Storage Constrained Information-Theoretic PIR
Consider a PIR problem where there are N non-colluding databases and K independent messages
W1,W2, . . . ,WK , where each message is of size L bits, i.e.,
H(W1) = H(W2) = . . . = H(WK) = L (1)
We assume that each database has a storage capacity of µKL bits. If we denote Z1, Z2, . . . , ZN
as the contents stored across the databases, then we have the following storage constraint for each
database:
H(Z1) = H(Z2) = . . . = H(ZN ) = µKL (2)
We allow the user to design what contents can be stored at each database subject to the storage
constraint. Furthermore, we assume that the storage strategy employed by the user is completely
public i.e., each database knows which contents are stored at all the other databases. The normal-
ized storage parameter µ can take values in the range 1/N ≤ µ ≤ 1. The case when µ = 1 is the
setting of replicated databases, with each database storing all the K messages. The lower bound
µ ≥ 1/N is in fact a necessary condition for reliable decoding.
To request a message, a user privately selects a number θ between 1 and K to correspond with
the desired message Wθ. Then the user generates N queries Q
[θ]
1 , Q
[θ]
2 , . . . , Q
[θ]
N that will be sent to
the N databases. The superscript θ indicates the desired message, which can be substituted with
any of the K messages. Privacy must be ensured from the moment the user decides on the message
being requested. Therefore, the queries must be independent of the messages.
∀k ∈ [K], I(W1,W2, . . . ,WK ;Q[k]1 , Q[k]2 , . . . , Q[k]N ) = 0 (3)
The user requests message Wk by sending a query Q
[k]
n to the n-th database, which then generates
and returns an answer A
[k]
n back to the user. The answer is a function of the corresponding query
4
and the data stored in the n-th database.
∀k ∈ [K], ∀n ∈ [N ], H(A[k]n |Q[k]n , Zn) = 0 (4)
From all of the answers from each database, the user must be able to correctly decode the
desired message Wk with a small probability of error. The correctness constraint is as follows
H(Wk|A[k]1 , . . . , A[k]N , Q[k]1 , . . . , Q[k]N ) = o(L) (5)
where o(L) represents a function of L such that o(L)/L approaches 0 as L approaches infinity.
In order to prevent the databases from learning which message has been requested, the following
privacy constraint must be satisfied.
(Q[i]n , A
[i]
n ,W1, . . . ,WK , Z1, . . . , Zn) ∼ (Q[j]n , A[j]n ,W1, . . . ,WK , Z1, . . . , Zn),∀i 6= j. (6)
For a storage parameter µ, we say that the pair (D,L) is achievable if there exists a Storage
Constrained PIR scheme with storage, querying, and decoding functions, which satisfy the storage,
correctness and privacy constraints. The performance of a PIR scheme is characterized by the
number of bits of desired information (L) per downloaded bit. In particular, if D is the total number
of downloaded bits, and L is the size of the desired message, then the normalized downloaded cost
is D/L. In other words, the PIR rate is L/D.
The goal is to characterize the optimal normalized download cost as a function of the per-
database storage parameter µ:
D∗(µ) = min {D/L : (D,L) is achievable}. (7)
The storage-constrained capacity of PIR is the inverse of the normalized download cost
C∗(µ) = max {L/D : (D,L) is achievable}. (8)
We first state and prove the following Lemma which shows that the optimal download cost
D∗(µ) (or the inverse of capacity 1/C∗(µ)) is a convex function of the normalized storage µ.
Lemma 1 The optimal download cost D∗(µ) is a convex function of µ. In other words, for any
(µ1, µ2), and α ∈ [0, 1], the optimal download cost satisfies
D∗(αµ1 + (1− α)µ2) ≤ αD∗(µ1) + (1− α)D∗(µ2). (9)
Proof of Lemma 1– Let us consider two storage parameters µ1, and µ2, with optimal download
costs D∗(µ1), and D∗(µ2) respectively using two storage constrained PIR schemes, say Scheme 1
and Scheme 2. Let us now consider a new storage point µ = αµ1 + (1 − α)µ2, for which we can
construct a PIR scheme as follows: we take each message Wi and divide it into two independent
parts Wi =
(
W
(1)
i ,W
(2)
i
)
, where W
(1)
i is of size L1 = αL bits, and W
(2)
i is of size L2 = (1−α)L bits.
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The total size of each message is hence L. For each sub-message, the databases utilize the storage
and PIR schemes 1, and 2 respectively. In particular, Scheme 1 requires a storage of µ1αKL bits,
and Scheme 2 requires a storage of µ2(1−α)KL bits. Furthermore, PIR from Scheme 1 requires a
download of D∗(µ1)L1 = αD∗(µ1)L bits and scheme 2 requires a download of (1−α)D∗(µ2)L bits.
Hence, the total downloaded data is therefore (αD∗(µ1)+(1−α)D∗(µ2))L, and hence the normalized
download cost for this memory-sharing scheme is (αD∗(µ1) + (1 − α)D∗(µ2)). Furthermore, the
total storage used by each database is S = (αµ1+(1−α)µ2)KL = µKL, i.e., the normalized storage
parameter is µ = αµ1 + (1 − α)µ2. Since D∗(αµ1 + (1 − α)µ2) by definition is optimal download
cost for normalized storage (αµ1 + (1− α)µ2), it must be upper bounded by the download cost of
the memory sharing scheme. Hence, the following inequality follows
D∗(αµ1 + (1− α)µ2) ≤ αD∗(µ1) + (1− α)D∗(µ2), (10)
which proves the convexity of D∗(µ).
3 Main Result and Discussions
We next present the main result of this paper in the following Theorem.
Theorem 1 For the storage constrained PIR problem with N Databases, K messages, (of size L
bits each), and a per database storage constraint of µKL bits, the lower convex hull of the following
(µ,D(µ)) pairs is achievable.
(µ, D(µ)) =
(
t
N
, 1 +
1
t
+ · · ·+ 1
tK−1
)
, (11)
for t = 1, 2, . . . , N .
Remark 1 The general tradeoff resulting from Theorem 1 is illustrated in Fig. 2. The smallest
value of µ = 1/N corresponds to the parameter t = 1, for which the download cost is maximal
and is equal to K. The other extreme value of storage is µ = 1, corresponding to t = N , i.e., the
setting of full storage in which every database can store all the messages. For this case, the optimal
download cost was characterized by Sun and Jafar [7] as (1 + 1N +
1
N2
+ ..... + 1
NK−1 ), where N is
number of databases.
The proof of Theorem 1 has two main parts: a) the storage design (i.e., how to store content across
N databases) subject to storage constraints; and b) the design of the PIR scheme from storage
constrained databases. We next describe our storage scheme while satisfying the constraint that
each database has a storage capability of at most µKL bits.
Storage Scheme for µ = t/N : For a fixed parameter t ∈ [1, . . . , N ], we take each message Wi
and sub-divide it into
(
N
t
)
sub-messages. In particular, each sub-message is indexed by a subset of
databases of size t. For instance, if t = 2, and N = 3, then each message Wi will be sub-divided
into
(
3
2
)
= 3 sub-messages as Wi = (Wi,{1,2},Wi,{2,3},Wi,{1,3}). Furthermore, we assume that each
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Figure 2: The tradeoff between storage and download cost for PIR.
sub-message is of size tK bits. Hence the total size of each message, i.e., L is given as L =
(
N
t
)
tK .
Using this message splitting scheme, we propose the storage scheme as follows: for every message,
each database stores all sub-messages which contain its index. For instance, for the t = 2, N = 3
databases, and K = 2 messages (say A, and B), we split the messages as A = (A12, A23, A13), and
B = (B12, B23, B13), and hence, the storage strategy is as follows:
• DB1 stores A12, A13, B12, B13
• DB2 stores A12, A23, B12, B23
• DB3 stores A13, A23, B13, B23
We next verify that the above scheme satisfies the storage constraint. To this end, we note that
for every message, each database stores
(
N−1
t−1
)
sub-messages (this corresponds to the number of
sub-sets of databases of size t in which the given database is present). Hence, the total storage
necessary for any database is given as:
K ×
(
N − 1
t− 1
)
× tK = t
N
×K ×N ×
(
N − 1
t− 1
)
× tK−1
=
t
N
×K ×
((
N
t
)
tK
)
=
t
N
×K × L = µKL
This shows that the proposed scheme satisfies the storage constraints for every database.
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Figure 3: Storage vs. download cost for (N,K) = (3, 2).
Before presenting the proof of the general PIR scheme for any (N,K, µ), we first provide some
representative examples which highlight the key new ideas and novel aspects that are necessary
for the general scheme. Our storage constrained PIR scheme is similar in spirit to the scheme of
Sun and Jafar in the sense that we also enforce symmetry across databases and message, and the
exploitation of undesired side information. The main difference from Sun and Jafar’s scheme is that
in storage constrained scenario, each database may not have access to all of the side information
retrieved from other databases. Hence, only those side information bits can be exploited which are
shared between databases. These similarities and differences will become more clear in following
examples.
Example 1 (N = 3 databases, K = 2 messages) In this example, we have 3 databases
(DB1, DB2, DB3), and K = 2 messages which we denote as A and B. As shown in Fig. 3,
the tradeoff has three critical points (labeled as P1, P2 and P3). The point P1 corresponds to
µ = 1/3, for which the PIR scheme is trivial: download all K = 2 messages. On the other ex-
treme, point P3 corresponds to µ = 1, for which the optimal PIR scheme is due to Sun and Jafar,
with a download cost of 4/3. For the sake of illustrative purposes, let us first revisit this scheme:
each message is divided into NK = 32 = 9 bits (i.e., the messages A and B are represented by
A = (a1, a2, . . . , a9), and B = (b1, b2, . . . , b9). Suppose that the user wants to retrieve message A
privately. Then, the scheme of Sun-Jafar works as shown in Table 1. The user downloads single
bits from each database for each of the two messages. In the second stage, the user downloads
the XOR’s of the bits of both messages and exploits side-information (i.e., the undesired bits of
message B) downloaded from the remaining (N − 1) = 2 databases. The user downloaded a total
of 12 bits, out of which the desired bits are 9 (corresponding to message A). Hence, the download
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Table 1: Sun-Jafar scheme for (N,K) = (3, 2)
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1 b1 a2 b2 a3 b3
a4 + b2 a6 + b1 a8 + b1
a5 + b3 a7 + b3 a9 + b2
cost of this scheme is D(1) = 12/9 = 4/3.
Storage Constrained PIR scheme for µ = 2/3 (point P2): We next present the scheme for µ =
2
3 ,
i.e., t = 2. Since t = 2, the total size of each message is chosen as L = 22
(
3
2
)
= 12 bits. Total
storage used by each database is given as S = µKL = 23 × 2 × 12 = 16 bits, and the data stored
across each database is shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Storage for (N,K) = (3, 2) and µ = 2/3 (t = 2)
DB1 DB2 DB3
a112 b
1
12 a
1
12 b
1
12 a
1
13 b
1
13
a113 b
1
13 a
1
23 b
1
23 a
1
23 b
1
23
a212 b
2
12 a
2
12 b
2
12 a
2
13 b
2
13
a213 b
2
13 a
2
23 b
2
23 a
2
23 b
2
23
a312 b
3
12 a
3
12 b
3
12 a
3
13 b
3
13
a313 b
3
13 a
3
23 b
3
23 a
3
23 b
3
23
a412 b
4
12 a
4
12 b
4
12 a
4
13 b
4
13
a413 b
4
13 a
4
23 b
4
23 a
4
23 b
4
23
Let us now assume that we want to retrieve message A privately. We start downloading single bits
(a112, a
1
13) from DB1 and for message symmetry (b
1
12, b
1
13) is also downloaded from DB1. Similarly,
we download (a212, a
1
23), (b
2
12, b
1
23) from DB2, and (a
2
13, a
2
23), (b
2
13, b
2
23) from DB3 is downloaded
(see Table 3). We next move to the second stage of the scheme, in which the user exploits the side
Table 3: Storage Constrained PIR Scheme (µ = 2/3)
DB1 DB2 DB3
a112 b
1
12 a
2
12 b
2
12 a
2
13 b
2
13
a113 b
1
13 a
1
23 b
1
23 a
2
23 b
2
23
a312 + b
2
12 a
4
12 + b
1
12 a
4
13 + b
1
13
a313 + b
2
13 a
3
23 + b
1
23 a
4
23 + b
1
23
information (or undesired bits of message B). However, the main difference from full storage is
that not all side-information can be exploited from every database due to the storage constraint. In
particular, we can notice that from the perspective of database 1, only those bits of the undesired
message B can be leveraged as side information that are stored at DB1, i.e., the bits which have
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DB1 as one of the index in the subset of t databases that have stored that bit. For this example,
only the bits b212 and b
2
13 can be leveraged as side information through DB1.
From Table 3, we can count the number of useful bits downloaded as 12 and total number of bits
downloaded 18. This leads to the download cost of 1812 =
3
2 which matches the result of Theorem 1.
Example 2 (N = 3 databases, K = 3 messages) In this example, we have 3 databases
(DB1, DB2, DB3), and K = 3 messages which we denote as A,B and C. As shown in Fig.
4, the tradeoff has three critical points (labeled as P1, P2 and P3). As the point P1 is trivial and P3
follows from the work of Sun and Jafar, we explain the achievability of the point P2. For this point,
we have t = 2, and hence each message is of size L = tK
(
N
t
)
= 23 × 3 = 24 bits. In particular, we
split each message into
(
3
2
)
= 3 sub-messages, and each sub-message is of size 23 = 8 bits as follows:
• A = (a112, . . . , a812, a123, . . . , a823, a113, . . . , a813)
• B = (b112, . . . , b812, b123, . . . , b823, b113, . . . , b813)
• C = (c112, . . . , c812, c123, . . . , c823, c113, . . . , c813)
Subsequently, DBi stores those bits (of each message) whose index contains i. Hence, the total
storage required per DB is 3× 2× 8 = 48 bits. With the storage designed, the PIR scheme works
as follows in three stages:
Stage 1: In this stage, we download single bits from the messages. From DB1, we download
(a112, a
1
13), then we download (b
1
12, b
1
13), and (c
1
12, c
1
13) to maintain message symmetry. Similarly,
(a212, a
1
23, b
2
12, b
1
23, c
2
12, c
1
23) and (a
2
13, a
2
23, b
2
13, b
2
23, c
2
13, c
2
23) are downloaded from DB2 and DB3
respectively.
Stage 2: In the second stage, we download pairs of bits with the goal of maximally utilizing the
side information (of undesired messages) in the previous stage. Again, the key aspect to note here
is that when downloading bits from DB1’s, we can only utilize those bits as side information which
are stored at it. For this example, we can utilize b212, c
2
12, b
2
13, c
2
13 since these bits were downloaded
from DB2 and DB3 in Stage 1, and are also stored at DB1. As shown in Table 4, we download
(a312 + b
2
12, a
4
12 + c
2
12, a
5
13 + b
2
13, a
6
13 + c
2
13) from DB1. In order to maintain message symmetry, we
also download (b312 + c
3
12, b
3
13 + c
3
13) from DB1. We follow a similar process across DB2 and DB3.
Stage 3: In the final stage, we download triples of bits (i.e., a + b + c’s) from each database.
Following the same principle as before, we can observe that when downloading from DB1, we can
leverage (b412 + c
4
12) and (b
4
13 + c
4
13) as side information which was downloaded in Stage 2, and is
available at DB1. As shown in Table 4, we download a
7
12 + b
4
12 + c
4
12 and a
7
13 + b
4
13 + c
4
13 from DB1.
We follow a similar process for the other two databases.
We can readily verify that from the data downloaded from all three databases (which is 42
bits), the user is able to correctly retrieve the message A, i.e., the user is able to decode all 24
desired bits (a112, . . . , a
8
12, a
1
23, . . . , a
8
23, a
1
13, . . . , a
8
13). Hence, the download cost of our scheme is
D(23) =
42
24 = 7/4 which is equal to the expression in Theorem 1 and also shown in Fig. 4 (point
P2).
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Figure 4: Storage vs. download cost for (N,K) = (3, 3).
Table 4: Storage Constrained PIR: (N,K) = (3, 3), µ = 2/3
DB1 DB2 DB3
a112 b
1
12 c
1
12 a
2
12 b
2
12 c
2
12 a
2
13 b
2
13 c
2
13
a113 b
1
13 c
1
13 a
1
23 b
1
23 c
1
23 a
2
23 b
2
23 c
2
23
a312 + b
2
12 a
5
12 + b
1
12 a
5
13 + b
1
13
a313 + c
2
13 a
3
23 + c
1
12 a
5
23 + c
1
13
a412 + b
2
13 a
6
12 + b
2
23 a
6
13 + b
1
23
a413 + c
2
13 a
4
23 + c
2
23 a
6
23 + c
1
23
b312 + c
3
12 b
4
12 + c
4
12 b
4
13 + c
4
13
b313 + c
3
13 b
3
23 + c
3
23 b
4
23 + c
4
23
a712 + b
4
12 + c
4
12 a
8
12 + b
3
12 + c
3
12 a
8
13 + b
4
12 + c
4
12
a713 + b
4
13 + c
4
13 a
7
23 + b
4
23 + c
4
23 a
8
13 + b
3
23 + c
3
23
4 Proof of Theorem 1 (Storage Constrained PIR Scheme)
In this section, we present the proof of the general storage constrained PIR scheme for any (N,K).
We focus on the storage parameter µ = t/N for any t ∈ [1 : N ]. In the general scheme, we follow
the same philosophy introduced in the examples. Namely, the general scheme works in a sequence
of K stages, where in each stage, we download tuples of bits by exploiting side information obtained
from the previous stage, maintain message symmetry, as well as symmetry across databases. Most
importantly, the exploitation of side information is carefully designed to account for the limited
storage capabilities of the databases. We next present the general scheme, and assume that we
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Table 5: General Storage Constrained PIR Scheme: Total vs. Desired Downloaded Bits (per DB)
Stages Tuple Total (Per DB) Useful (Per DB)
Stage 1 Single
(
K
1
)(
N−1
t−1
) (
N−1
t−1
)
Stage 2 Pair
(
K
2
)
(N − 1)(N−2t−2 )(t− 1)0 (K−11 )(N − 1)(N−2t−2 )(t− 1)0
Stage 3 Triple
(
K
3
)
(N − 1)(N−2t−2 )(t− 1)1 (K−12 )(N − 1)(N−2t−2 )(t− 1)1
. . . .
. . . .
Stage i i-tuple
(
K
i
)
(N − 1)(N−2t−2 )(t− 1)i−2 (K−1i−1 )(N − 1)(N−2t−2 )(t− 1)i−2
. . . .
. . . .
Stage K K-tuple
(
K
K
)
(N − 1)(N−2t−2 )(t− 1)K−2 (K−1K−1)(N − 1)(N−2t−2 )(t− 1)K−2
want to privately retrieve message 1.
Stage 1: In the first stage, we start downloading single bits of each message from each database.
Let us focus on a single database (say DB1). From this database, we first download
(
N−1
t−1
)
bits
from the desired message A, where each bit is from one of the
(
N−1
t−1
)
sub-messages of message
A. In order to main privacy, we introduce message symmetry, and perform the same downloading
operation for all the remaining (K − 1) messages. Hence, from each DB, we download a total of(
K
1
)(
N−1
t−1
)
bits, out of which the number of desired bits are
(
N−1
t−1
)
. This is also shown in the first
row of Table 5.
Stage 2: In the second stage, we download pairs of bits. To this end, let us focus on DB1. From
DB1’s perspective, we can download the desired bits of message A along with undesired bits of
the remaining (K − 1) messages that have been downloaded from the remaining (N − 1) databases
and are also stored at DB1. We now carefully go over this sequence of steps: a) first note that the
number of pairings of a desired message with undesired message is
(
K−1
1
)
; b) second, the number
of other databases that can be paired with DB1 are (N − 1); c) for a fixed pairing with other
database (say DBi, i 6= 1), the number of sub-messages which are stored at both DB1 and DBi are(
N−2
t−2
)
. For each such sub-message, the number of undesired bits that were stored at DB1 and were
downloaded from DBi in Stage 1 are (t − 1)0 = 1. Hence, from DB1 the number of desired bits
downloaded in Stage 2 are
(
K−1
1
)
(N − 1)(N−2t−2 )(t − 1)0, whereas the total number of downloaded
bits are
(
K
2
)
(N − 1)(N−2t−2 )(t− 1)0.
Stage i: We continue to proceed and in the general stage i, we download tuples of bits composed of
i different messages. Again, focusing from DB1’s perspective, we can download the desired bits of
message A along with undesired bits of the remaining (K−1) messages that have been downloaded
from the remaining (N − 1) databases and are also stored at DB1. We now carefully go over this
sequence of steps: a) the number of pairings of a desired message with (i− 1) undesired messages
is
(
K−1
i−1
)
; b) second, the number of other databases that can be paired with DB1 are (N −1); c) for
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a fixed pairing with other database (say DB`, ` 6= 1), the number of sub-messages which are stored
at both DB1 and DB` are
(
N−2
t−2
)
. For each such sub-message, the number of undesired bits that
were stored at DB1 and were downloaded from DB` in Stage (i − 1) are (t − 1)i−2. Hence, from
DB1 the number of desired bits downloaded in Stage i are
(
K−1
i−1
)
(N − 1)(N−2t−2 )(t− 1)i−2, whereas
the total number of downloaded bits are
(
K
i
)
(N − 1)(N−2t−2 )(t− 1)i−2. We similarly continue till K
stages. Let us now calculate the total number of desired and downloaded bits:
Desired bits (per DB) =
(
N − 1
t− 1
)
+
K∑
i=2
(
K − 1
i− 1
)
(N − 1)
(
N − 2
t− 2
)
(t− 1)i−2
=
(
N − 1
t− 1
)
+ (N − 1)
(
N − 2
t− 2
) K∑
i=2
(
K − 1
i− 1
)
(t− 1)i−2
=
(
N − 1
t− 1
)
+
(N − 1)
(t− 1)
(
N − 2
t− 2
) K∑
i=2
(
K − 1
i− 1
)
(t− 1)i−1
=
(
N − 1
t− 1
)
+
(N − 1)
(t− 1)
(
N − 2
t− 2
)
(tK−1 − 1)
=
(
N − 1
t− 1
)
+
(N − 1)
(t− 1)
(
N − 2
t− 2
)
(tK−1 − 1)
=
(
N − 1
t− 1
)
+
(
N − 1
t− 1
)
(tK−1 − 1) =
(
N − 1
t− 1
)
tK−1 =
1
N
×
(
N
t
)
tK (12)
Since the above is the number is the desired number of bits (per-DB), hence, from all the N
databases, the user is able to recover all L =
(
N
t
)
tK bits of the desired message.
Total downloaded bits (per DB) =
(
N − 1
t− 1
)(
K
1
)
+
K∑
i=2
(
K
i
)
(N − 1)
(
N − 2
t− 2
)
(t− 1)i−2
=
(
N − 1
t− 1
)(
K
1
)
+ (N − 1)
(
N − 2
t− 2
) K∑
i=2
(
K
i
)
(t− 1)i−2
=
(
N − 1
t− 1
)(
K
1
)
+
(N − 1)
(t− 1)
(
N − 2
t− 2
) K∑
i=2
(
K
i
)
(t− 1)i−1
=
(
N − 1
t− 1
)(
K
1
)
+
(
N − 1
t− 1
) K∑
i=2
(
K
i
)
(t− 1)i−1
=
(
N − 1
t− 1
)(
K +
K∑
i=2
(
K
i
)
(t− 1)i−1
)
=
(
N − 1
t− 1
)(
K +
1
t− 1
K∑
i=2
(
K
i
)
(t− 1)i
)
=
(
N − 1
t− 1
)(
K +
1
t− 1(t
K − 1− (t− 1)K)
)
=
(
N − 1
t− 1
)
tK − 1
t− 1 =
(
N − 1
t− 1
)
(1 + t+ t2 + . . .+ tK−1)
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Hence, the download cost D(µ) of the storage constrained PIR scheme when µ = t/N is given as
D(µ) =
N × Total Downloaded bits (per DB)
N ×Desired bits (per DB)
=
(
N−1
t−1
)
(1 + t+ t2 + . . .+ tK−1)(
N−1
t−1
)
tK−1
= 1 +
1
t
+
1
t2
+ . . .+
1
tK−1
. (13)
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
5 Conclusion
In this work, we investigated the PIR problem from storage constrained databases. The main
contribution of this work is a general achievable scheme for PIR from storage constrained databases
for any value of storage. In particular, for any (N,K), with normalized storage µ = t/N , where
the parameter t can take integer values t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, we show that our proposed PIR scheme
achieves a download cost of
(
1 + 1t +
1
t2
+ · · ·+ 1
tK−1
)
. Furthermore, the lower convex hull of all
such (D(µ), µ) pairs is also achievable and the scheme strictly outperforms memory sharing between
the extreme values of µ. There are several interesting directions for future work on this important
variation of PIR. An immediate interesting direction would be to obtain lower bounds on the
PIR capacity (or download cost) as a function of the storage. Moreover, it would be interesting
to investigate storage-constrained PIR problems by considering scenarios such as (i) colluding
databases; and (ii) having additional constraints on storage (such as data recoverability constraints
from any ` out of N databases).
References
[1] B. Chor, O. Goldreich, E. Kushilevitz, and M. Sudan. Private information retrieval. In
Proceedings of the 36th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 41–
50. IEEE Computer Society, 1995.
[2] T. Gupta, N. Crooks, W. Mulhern, S. Setty, L. Alvisi, and M. Walfish. Scalable and private
media consumption with popcorn. In Proceedings of 13th USENIX Symposium on Networked
Systems Design and Implementation, pages 91–107, 2016.
[3] D. Demmler, A. Herzberg, and T. Schneider. RAID-PIR: Practical multi-server PIR. In
Proceedings of the 6th Edition of the ACM Workshop on Cloud Computing Security, pages
45–56, 2014.
[4] C. Cachin, S. Micali, and M. Stadler. Computationally private information retrieval with
polylogarithmic communication. In Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Theory
and Application of Cryptographic Techniques, pages 402–414. Springer-Verlag, 1999.
[5] S. Yekhanin. Private information retrieval. Communications of the ACM, 53(4):68–73, 2010.
[6] N. Shah, K. Rashmi, and K. Ramchandran. One extra bit of download ensures perfectly
private information retrieva. In Proceedings of IEEE International Symposium on Information
Theory (ISIT), 2014.
14
[7] H. Sun and S. A. Jafar. The capacity of private information retrieval. IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, 63(7):4075–4088, 2017.
[8] H. Sun and S. A Jafar. The capacity of robust private information retrieval with colluding
databases. CoRR, abs/1605.00635, 2016.
[9] K. Banawan and S. Ulukus. The capacity of private information retrieval from byzantine and
colluding databases. CoRR, abs/1706.01442, 2017.
[10] R. Tajeddine and S. El Rouayheb. Private information retrieval from MDS coded data in
distributed storage systems. CoRR, abs/1602.01458, 2016.
[11] K. Banawan and S. Ulukus. The capacity of private information retrieval from coded databases.
CoRR, abs/1609.08138, 2016.
[12] R. Freij-Hollanti, O. W. Gnilke, C. Hollanti, and D. A. Karpuk. Private information retrieval
from coded databases with colluding servers. CoRR, abs/1611.02062, 2016.
[13] H. Sun and S. A. Jafar. Private information retrieval from MDS coded data with colluding
servers: Settling a conjecture by Freij-Hollanti et al. CoRR, abs/1701.07807, 2017.
[14] H. Sun and S. A. Jafar. The capacity of symmetric private information retrieval. In 2016
IEEE Globecom Workshops, pages 1–5, 2016.
[15] Q. Wang and M. Skoglund. Symmetric private information retrieval for MDS coded distributed
storage. CoRR, abs/1610.04530, 2016.
[16] K. Banawan and S. Ulukus. Multi-message private information retrieval: Capacity results and
near-optimal schemes. CoRR, abs/1702.01739, 2017.
[17] Y. Zhang and G. Ge. Multi-file private information retrieval from MDS coded databases with
colluding servers. CoRR, abs/1705.03186, 2017.
[18] R. Tandon. The capacity of cache aided private information. CoRR, abs/1706.07035, 2017.
[19] Z. Chen, Z. Wang, and S. Jafar. The capacity of private information retrieval with private
side information. CoRR, abs/1709.03022, 2017.
[20] Yi-Peng Wei, K. Banawan, and S. Ulukus. Fundamental limits of cache-aided private infor-
mation retrieval with unknown and uncoded prefetching. CoRR, abs/1709.01056, 2017.
[21] S. Kadhe, B. Garcia, A. Heidarzadeh, S. El Rouayheb, and A. Sprintson. Private information
retrieval with side information. CoRR, abs/1709.00112, 2017.
[22] H. Sun and S. Jafar. Multiround private information retrieval: Capacity and storage overhead.
CoRR, abs/1611.02257, 2016.
[23] M. A. Maddah-Ali and U. Niesen. Fundamental limits of caching. IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, 60(5):2856–2867, May 2014.
15
